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Abstract
Rankings to evaluate opportunity distributions present in most lit-
erature judge a policy (change from one distribution of opportunities to
another) on the basis of the changes created and, thus, independently
of the original situation. This paper proposes a group of axioms captur-
ing the idea that rankings of equality of opportunities might consider
not only the changes promoted, but also the initial situation in society.
The combination of this group of axioms with other well-established
properties enables us to characterize two families of new opportunity
distribution rankings. The ﬁrst family weighs each individual’s per-
centage share in the total number of opportunities, while the second
weighs opportunities depending on how many agents have them avail-
able.
Keywords and Phrases: Opportunity proﬁles, Advantage, Equality, Eval-
uation of Policies.
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1 Introduction
Opportunities
According to classical theories of welfarism, social situations should be eval-
uated by the extent to which the preferences of individuals are satisﬁed.
Hence, in line with the view that individuals choose the life providing them
with the greatest welfare, we could merely evaluate social situations by ob-
serving the way of life actually chosen by individuals.1
However, several contemporary theories of justice are less enthusiastic
on such a narrow way of judging societies. Examples include Dworkin [8, 9],
who proposes paying attention to individual resources when describing the
goodness of a social situation. Rawls [21] places special emphasis on cer-
tain resources available to agents, i.e., primary goods. Sen [23] complements
Rawls’ approach by suggesting that capabilities to function be considered,
i.e., the interaction between available resources and individual abilities. Ar-
neson [3] also suggests departing from actual welfare and focus on opportu-
nity for welfare.
In a nutshell, some of these authors argue that preferences can be aﬀected
by the availability of opportunities, as in the case of adaptive preferences,
posed by Elster [11]. These theories further endorse that the intrinsic value
of the availability of opportunities, i.e., the freedom of choice, has to be con-
sidered.2 Hence, we should pay more attention to an objective description
of the set of opportunities available to individuals at the moment of tak-
ing life decisions, while incorporating the intrinsic value of the availability
of opportunities. In short, social situations should be judged by describ-
ing, for each individual, the collection of alternative lives available: their
opportunity sets.
1In practice, most studies tend to focus exclusively on income as a proxy for welfare.
2Sen [23, 24] and Pattanaik and Xu [19] also discuss the role of preferences vis-a-vis
opportunities.
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From a more technical perspective, an available life or opportunity can
be understood as a description of all the aspects of a possible life the individ-
ual may choose to follow. There are at least two diﬀerent formalizations of
this concept that have attracted attention. In the literature that goes back
to the measurement of freedom of choice, an opportunity is an abstract and
ﬂexible description of those aspects of life that we may consider relevant.
Thus, opportunities have no particular mathematical structure and an op-
portunity set is just a subset of the universal set of opportunities.3 In the
literature that goes back to the notion of capabilities, an opportunity is a
vector of functionings, where functionings are all kinds of personal achieve-
ments that individuals may obtain in their lives. Then, an opportunity set
can be represented by a set (not necessarily convex) in the space ℝ푛.4 Not
surprisingly, these two literatures are intimately connected. In many cases,
the latter constitutes a particularization of the former that allows those non-
welfarist approaches to be used in applied studies. An example is the study
of Echavarri and Permanyer [10] that adapts the proposals of Herrero et al.
[14] to the context of functionings.
In this paper, we adopt the view that social situations should be ranked
considering the opportunity sets available to individuals in society objec-
tively. We formalize our debate technically by using the more ﬂexible mod-
elization of opportunities.
Evaluation of Opportunity Distributions
A natural approach to ranking social situations in terms of opportunity sets
of individuals is to incorporate the key classical concepts of inequality and,
3See, for instance, Kranich [16], Herrero [13], Herrero et al. [14], Bossert et al. [6], Ok
and Kranich [18], Savaglio and Vanucci [22], Weymark [26], Alcalde-Unzu et al. [1] and
Alcalde-Unzu and Ballester [2] (for a survey of some of this literature, see Peragine [20]).
4In this context, opportunity sets are also called capability sets. See, for instance,
Fleurbaey [12] and Echavarri and Permanyer [10].
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as a consequence, to reformulate the notion of advantage embedded in them.
For instance, the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle states that a transfer from
an advantaged to a disadvantaged individual (without reversing the order)
results in a better social situation. In the income distribution framework,
the notion of advantage is deﬁned through the well-ordered welfare or in-
come of individuals. However, the non-welfarist framework of opportunities
lacks a unique clear notion of advantage. A widely used candidate to sub-
stitute income is the cardinality of the opportunity set (see Pattanaik and
Xu [19]). This ranking can be considered to only measure very limited as-
pects of freedom of choice and it is thus a rather crude basis for comparing
individual opportunity sets. However, according to the view that individual
preferences are not as relevant, few alternatives remain. We may obviously
use a social common ranking for evaluating the goodness of an opportunity
set. Unfortunately, Ok [17] proved that the cardinality-based criterion is the
unique complete ranking that makes the reformulation of the Pigou-Dalton
transfer principle and some other basic properties of equality compatible.
An incomplete ranking of individual opportunity sets may alternatively be
considered. Existing literature has paid special attention to the inclusion
ranking (that is, an individual is advantaged with respect to another only if
the former has all the opportunities available to the latter).
Alcalde-Unzu and Ballester [2] present characterization results showing
that most of the literature on ranking social situations through opportunity
sets can be summarized by accepting either the cardinality or the inclusion
notion of advantage and building upon one of these notions by:
(a) Imposing minimal conditions regarding the goodness of opportunity
distributions based on some classical fairness concepts: Anonymity, which
implies that the names of the agents should not matter; Assimilation, which
implies that the opportunity proﬁle obtained as a result of the addition of
common opportunities to all agents or the replacement of distinct opportu-
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nities by common ones, should not be worse than the original opportunity
proﬁle; and Priority for the Poor, which implies that giving new opportu-
nities to those agents who are undoubtedly most disadvantaged should be
better than giving them to other agents (or to no agent).5
(b) Imposing an Independence condition on the policies undertaken re-
sulting in changes in the sets of opportunities available to diﬀerent agents in
society.6 Speciﬁcally, the comparison of the goodness of two societies is not
modiﬁed by the application of a common policy. Together with the proper-
ties in (a), Independence implies that policies are evaluated either as positive
or negative, but this evaluation is independent of the initial distribution of
opportunities.
This paper seeks to promote the idea that the initial situation should
matter when evaluating policies that change the distribution of opportu-
nities. For example, perturbing a perfectly equal society to obtain some
extra opportunities might be perceived as substantially diﬀerent in a society
where individuals already have a wide variety of opportunities or in another
where they have few opportunities. Consequently, we look for criteria to
rank social situations that accept either the cardinality or the inclusion no-
tion of advantage and build upon one of these notions combining the three
well-established goodness properties of part (a) with some axioms that cap-
ture the idea that the goodness of a policy should depend on the original
situation of society. As a result, Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 analyze how to re-
consider the classical concept of equality of opportunities, suggesting that
social situations should be judged as follows.
Under the cardinality approach, Theorem 3.1 establishes a family of
5Priority for the Poor is called Monotonicity in Alcalde-Unzu and Ballester [2].
6The technical deﬁnition of a policy will be provided in Section 2. In non-technical
terms, a policy is a description of the diﬀerences between any two opportunity proﬁles.
These diﬀerences could eventually (but not necessarily) be the result of the application of
a policy undertaken by a government to the ﬁrst proﬁle leading to the second proﬁle.
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criteria that weighs each individual’s percentage share in the total number
of opportunities. These weights decrease with respect to the cardinality of
the opportunity set, in the sense that individuals with fewer opportunities
are assigned a higher weight in the social comparison. Under the partial
inclusion approach, Theorem 3.2 establishes a family of rankings that weighs
opportunities depending on how many agents have them available. The
weights decrease with respect to this number of individuals, in the sense
that the percentage of opportunities shared by all individuals has greater
weight than the percentage of opportunities shared by all the individuals
except one, and so on.
The remainder of this paper is divided as follows. Section 2 discusses the
existing criteria to rank social situations in terms of opportunities. Section
3 introduces properties that allow the goodness of policies to depend on the
initial social situation and includes the new characterization results. Section
4 concludes. Finally, the proofs of the results are included in the Appendix.
2 Ranking Opportunity Distributions through In-
dependent Evaluation of Policies
Our stylized model deals mainly with the three-agent case. We consider this
case to be the most prominent, as it preserves the clarity and intuition of
the common two-agent case within this literature, while it also incorporates
some interesting features that are only present in the general (푛-agent) case.
For instance, in a three-agent society, it is possible to consider how an agent
who is neither the most disadvantaged nor the most advantaged should
be treated in the pursuit of equity. Hence, consider a society consisting
of three individuals 퐼 = {1, 2, 3} and an inﬁnite set 푋 that describes all
possible opportunities. An opportunity set for agent 푖 ∈ 퐼 is an element
푂푖 ∈ 퐿, where 퐿 denotes the set of all non-empty and ﬁnite subsets of 푋.
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A social situation will be judged according to the proﬁle of opportunity sets
푂 = (푂1, 푂2, 푂3) ∈ 퐿3. We look for criteria to rank proﬁles of opportunity
sets, and we denote by≿⊆ 퐿3×퐿3 a transitive and complete binary relation.
We interpret 푂 ≿ 푈 as “proﬁle O is socially preferred to proﬁle U”. The
relations ≻ and ∼ are deﬁned as usual.
Given 푂 ∈ 퐿3, we say that the collection of sets 푝 = {퐴푖, 퐵푖}푖∈퐼 ∈ (퐿∪∅)6
such that 퐴푖 ⊆ 푂푖, 퐵푖 ∩푂푖 = ∅ and 푂푝푖 = (푂푖 ∖퐴푖)∪퐵푖 ∈ 퐿 for all 푖 ∈ 퐼 is a
policy compatible with 푂. A compatible policy describes the opportunities
that are added to and removed from the opportunity sets of the individuals
in the society. That is, given the initial situation of individual 푖 described
by opportunity set 푂푖, opportunities 퐴푖 are removed from the opportunity
set of individual 푖, and opportunities 퐵푖 are added to the opportunity set of
individual 푖.7 As a consequence of the removal and addition of opportunities,
individual 푖 resulting set of opportunities 푂푝푖 should be non-empty. We say
that the opportunity proﬁle 푂푝 = (푂푝1, 푂
푝
2, 푂
푝
3) is the social consequence
of applying the policy 푝 to the proﬁle 푂. We say that a policy 푝 applied
to a proﬁle 푂 ∈ 퐿3 is good (respectively bad, respectively neutral) if the
proﬁle 푂푝 obtained after the application of the policy 푝 is strictly better
(respectively strictly worse, respectively indiﬀerent) than the initial proﬁle
푂.
The ﬁrst three basic properties of the model judge certain policies as
good, bad or neutral policies. The ﬁrst classical property on the evaluation
of social situations is that the names of the agents should not matter. To
formally deﬁne this property, we make use of some particular permutations
over the set of individuals. Given a social situation 푂 ∈ 퐿3, 휎푂 denotes the
set of permutations 휎 of 퐼 such that ∣푂휎(3)∣ ≤ ∣푂휎(2)∣ ≤ ∣푂휎(1)∣. The proﬁle
(푂휎(1), 푂휎(2), 푂휎(3)) is denoted by 휎(푂).
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7The requirements 퐴푖 ⊆ 푂푖 and 퐵푖 ∩ 푂푖 = ∅ are introduced to guarantee that the
impact of a policy is equivalent across diﬀerent proﬁles.
8Throughout the paper, we avoid making the universal quantiﬁer for permutations
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Anonymity (ANON): 푂 ∼ 휎(푂) for all 푂 ∈ 퐿3.
In other words, a policy that reallocates the entire opportunity sets
among the individuals is neutral. This is a standard property in the lit-
erature.
The second basic property deals with the provision of common oppor-
tunities to agents, which should be considered to be not worse than the
provision of heterogeneous opportunities or the absence of any provision.
To formally deﬁne this property, we introduce the following notation: 푂∪
will be the set that includes all opportunities that at least one individual in
푂 has; i.e, 푂∪ =
∪
푖∈퐼 푂푖 and, similarly, 푂
∩ will be the set of opportunities
that all individuals in 푂 have; i.e, 푂∩ =
∩
푖∈퐼 푂푖.
Assimilation (ASM): For all 푂 ∈ 퐿3 and for all 푥 ∈ (푋 ∖ 푂∪) and
푦1, 푦2, 푦3 ∈ 푋, (푂1∪{푥}, 푂2∪{푥}, 푂3∪{푥}) ≿ (푂1∪{푦1}, 푂2∪{푦2}, 푂3∪{푦3})
whenever:
1. 푦푖 ∈ 푂푖 for all 푖 ∈ 퐼 or
2. for all 퐾 ⊆ 퐼, there exists 푦 ∈ {푦푘}푘∈퐾 such that 푦 ∕∈
∪
푘∈퐾 푂푘.
In other words, the ﬁrst part of the property says that the policy that as-
signs a novel common opportunity to all individuals is never bad. This ﬁrst
part is a weakening of the standard Independence of Common Expansions
property that imposes indiﬀerence between the original situation and the
resulting one. The second part of the property says that a policy removing
a certain uncommon opportunity of each agent and providing a common op-
portunity to all of them is never bad. This second part is a weakening of the
standard Assimilation property to avoid certain controversies. For a wide
discussion on these weakenings, see Alcalde-Unzu and Ballester [2]. The
justiﬁcation of this property diﬀers depending on the notion of advantage
explicit when writing 휎(푂).
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adopted. If the cardinality-based criterion is used to judge advantage, this
implies indirectly that the quality of all opportunities is equivalent and the
axiom is then not controversial. If, however, we have adopted the Partial
Inclusion Ranking, there is no information on the quality of the opportu-
nities. The addition of the same opportunity to both proﬁles does not add
new inequalities between the individuals. On the other hand, the addition
of diﬀerent opportunities may decrease or increase the degree of equality of
the proﬁle depending on the previous relative situation of the individuals
and the possibly diﬀerent quality of the new opportunities. This is totally
unknown as the partial inclusion criterion has been adopted. What the ax-
iom is imposing in this case is that the criterion to rank opportunity proﬁles
should not be risk lover in this context of complete uncertainty, something
that the majority of criteria proposed in the literature of complete uncer-
tainty satisﬁes (two classical examples are the maxmin and the protective
criteria. See Barbera and Jackson [5]).
The third basic property has to do with a basic idea of equalization.
Giving new opportunities to those agents who are undoubtedly most disad-
vantaged should be better than giving them to other agents or to no agent.
To formally deﬁne this property, we make use of the concept of nested pro-
ﬁles of opportunity sets. A proﬁle 푂 is nested if 푂휎(3) ⊆ 푂휎(2) ⊆ 푂휎(1) for
all 휎 ∈ 휎푂. In particular, 풩 denotes the set of nested proﬁles in which the
identity mapping belongs to 휎푂. That is, 풩 = {푂 ∈ 퐿3 such that 푂3 ⊆
푂2 ⊆ 푂1}. We also deﬁne for any 푂 ∈ 퐿3, 푖 ∈ 퐼 and 푥 ∈ 푋, a new proﬁle
푂(푥, 푖) for which individual 푖 has the set 푂푖 ∪ {푥} and any other individual
푗 ∈ 퐼 ∖ {푖} has the opportunity set 푂푗 .
Priority for the Poor (PRI): For all 푂 ∈ 풩 , for all 푖, 푗 ∈ 퐼 such that
푗 > 푖 and for all 푥 ∕∈ 푂푗 , 푂(푥, 푗) ≿ 푂(푥, 푖), with strict preference if 푗 = 3
and 푥 ∈ 푂푘 for all 푘 ∕= 3.
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In other words, we can undoubtedly claim in a nested proﬁle that agent 1
is more advantaged than agent 2 and also, agent 2 is more advantaged than
agent 3.9 Hence, any policy that assigns an opportunity to a disadvantaged
individual is never bad. Any policy that removes an opportunity from an
advantaged individual and assigns it to a disadvantaged individual is never
bad. Finally, a policy that assigns an opportunity to the most disadvantaged
individual that all the other individuals already have is always good.
In addition to these properties, the proposals of the literature satisfy a
condition of Independence that reﬂects the following idea: the application
of a common policy with certain characteristics to two diﬀerent societies
does not modify the judgement regarding which of these societies is better.
To introduce the axiom formally, some extra notation is needed. A non-
reversal policy is a policy where the positions of the individuals according
to the ranking used to judge advantage do not revert.10 As has already been
stated, two possible rankings are studied: the Cardinality-based Criterion
and the Partial Inclusion Criterion. Therefore, given 푂 ∈ 풩 a policy 푝
compatible with 푂 is a non-reversal policy according to the Cardinality-
based Criterion if ∣푂푝푗 ∣ ≥ ∣푂푝푖 ∣ for all 푗 < 푖. Similarly, given 푂 ∈ 풩 , a
policy 푝 compatible with 푂 is a non-reversal policy according to the Partial
Inclusion Criterion if 푂푝푗 ⊂ 푂푝푖 does not occur for any 푗 < 푖. Denote the set
of non-reversal policies of 푂 according to the Cardinality-based Criterion
by 풫#푂 and the set of non-reversal policies of 푂 according to the Partial
Inclusion Criterion by 풫⊆푂 . Depending on the ranking, we have two possible
9Note that this claim is true both for the set inclusion notion of advantage and the
cardinality notion, which is merely a completion of the former.
10Non-reversal policies are also discussed in other frameworks, such as the literature
on horizontal equity of tax policies. The idea behind horizontal equity is to describe a
progressive transfer in which individuals are equalized, but their relative situation is not
reverted. In tax literature, the pre-tax income distribution is considered to have ethical
status that should not be totally violated (see King [15], for example).
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speciﬁcations of the axiom:
Independence-cardinality (IND-#): For all 푂,푈 ∈ 풩 and for all 푝 ∈
풫#푂 ∩ 풫#푈 , 푂 ≿ 푈 ⇒ 푂푝 ≿ 푈푝.
Independence-inclusion (IND-⊆): For all 푂,푈 ∈ 풩 and for all 푝 ∈
풫⊆푂 ∩ 풫⊆푈 , 푂 ≿ 푈 ⇒ 푂푝 ≿ 푈푝.
The combination of Independence and the above properties implies that
any policy should be considered either good or bad, but judgement should
always be made independently of the original society to which it is applied.
The criteria of the literature diﬀer in the speciﬁcations of the sets of good
and bad policies. The following two theorems, included in Alcalde-Unzu
and Ballester [2] provide the basic structure of all possible criteria satisfying
the proposed properties. Before presenting them, we need to introduce an
additional piece of notation:
∩
푘
푂 = {푥 ∈ 푋 such that there exists 퐾 ⊆
퐼 with ∣퐾∣ = 푘 and 푥 ∈ 푂푖 for all 푖 ∈ 퐾}. Obviously,
∩
3
푂 = 푂∩ and∩
1
푂 = 푂∪.
Theorem 2.1 Let ≿ be a criterion satisfying ANON, ASM, PRI and IND-
#. Then, there exists 훼 = (훼1, 훼2) with 훼1 ≤ 훼2 ≤ 1 and 훼1 + 훼2 ≥ −1
such that for all 푂,푈 ∈ 퐿3,
∣푂휎(3)∣+ 훼2∣푂휎(2)∣+ 훼1∣푂휎(1)∣ > ∣푈휎(3)∣+ 훼2∣푈휎(2)∣+ 훼1∣푈휎(1)∣ ⇒ 푂 ≻ 푈.
Theorem 2.2 Let ≿ be a criterion satisfying ANON, ASM, PRI and IND-
⊆. Then, there exists 훽 = (훽1, 훽2) with 훽1 ≤ 훽2 ≤ 1 and 훽1 + 훽2 ≥ −1 such
that for all 푂,푈 ∈ 퐿3,
∣
∩
3
푂∣+ 훽2∣
∩
2
푂∣+ 훽1∣
∩
1
푂∣ > ∣
∩
3
푈 ∣+ 훽2∣
∩
2
푈 ∣+ 훽1∣
∩
1
푈 ∣ ⇒ 푂 ≻ 푈.
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The criteria of these two families diﬀer in the values of the parameters 훼
and 훽. These values reﬂect the diﬀerent concerns for equality and eﬃciency
issues of the criterion under consideration. To give one example, the criterion
with 훼 = (−1, 0) is a criterion of the equality criteria family characterized
by Kranich [16], meanwhile the criterion with 훼 = (0, 0) corresponding with
the maxmin criterion (discussed by Bossert et al. [6]) shows more concern
for eﬃciency issues.11
3 Ranking Opportunity Distributions through De-
pendent Evaluation of Policies
Section 2 discusses rankings of opportunity distributions that incorporate
the idea that the initial situation should not matter when evaluating policies
that change the distribution of opportunities. To the best of our knowledge,
this paper is the ﬁrst attempt at promoting the idea that policies should be
considered good or bad conditional on the society to which they are applied.
Although this dependence may take many diﬀerent forms, two properties
are proposed in this section: Policy Monotonicity and Intermediateness,
capturing the scope and degree of the idea of dependence of the status quo
for a ranking of equality of opportunities.12 These axioms will express the
idea that this dependence has to be produced with an idea of inequality
aversion.
To motivate Policy Monotonicity, suppose that there exist two diﬀerent
societies 푂 and 푈 , the ﬁrst of which is considered to provide more equality
of opportunities to individuals. Consider a policy that equalizes the indi-
11A fuller description of many of the criteria included in these two families and their
characteristics in terms of equality and eﬃciency considerations is included in Alcalde-
Unzu and Ballester [2].
12Given that the majority of the literature has focused on equality criteria, we have
adopted this interpretation as a starting point for this literature.
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viduals in society 푂. Then, Policy Monotonicity states that the same policy
equalizes also the individuals in the more unequal society 푈 . Consider, for
instance, that the policy consists of giving new opportunities to all agents
and is able to improve the equality of 푂. That means that the opportunities
given by the policy to the disadvantaged agents in society are suﬃcient to
socially compensate the additional opportunities that the advantaged agents
are receiving. It is intuitive to think that such a policy must also increase
the equality (or, at least, not to decrease it) if applied to a more unequal so-
ciety 푈 , where the margin to improve equality is higher. Notice that Policy
Monotonicity says nothing about the eﬀects on 푂 of a policy that constitutes
equalization for the more unequal society 푈 .
Analogously, Policy Monotonicity also imposes that if a policy reduces
the equality of society 푈 then it also reduces the equality of the more egal-
itarian society 푂. Additionally, the property also imposes that the appli-
cation of the same policy to two equivalent or indiﬀerent societies has the
same eﬀect on them. We propose two diﬀerent formulations of the property,
depending on the criterion used to evaluate advantage.
Policy Monotonicity-cardinality (PM-#): For all 푂,푈 ∈ 풩 and for all
푝 ∈ 풫#푂 ∩ 풫#푈 :
if 푂 ≻ 푈 , then {[푂푝 ≿ 푂 ⇒ 푈푝 ≿ 푈 ] and [푈 ≿ 푈푝 ⇒ 푂 ≿ 푂푝]} and
if 푂 ∼ 푈 , then 푂푝 ∼ 푈푝.
Policy Monotonicity-inclusion (PM-⊆): For all 푂,푈 ∈ 풩 and for all
푝 ∈ 풫⊆푂 ∩ 풫⊆푈 :
if 푂 ≻ 푈 , then {[푂푝 ≿ 푂 ⇒ 푈푝 ≿ 푈 ] and [푈 ≿ 푈푝 ⇒ 푂 ≿ 푂푝]} and
if 푂 ∼ 푈 , then 푂푝 ∼ 푈푝.
The second property, Intermediateness, requires the union of two social
distributions to be ranked between the two. That is, the addition to a
proﬁle of a more (respectively, less) egalitarian proﬁle constitutes a strict
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increase (respectively, reduction) in equality. If we interpret the union of
two nested proﬁles 푂 and 푈 as the application of the “policy” 푈 to the
proﬁle 푂 (or, alternatively, the “policy” 푂 to the proﬁle 푈), the axiom has
other interpretation: a policy is good (respectively, bad) if, when it can
be interpreted as a proﬁle, the policy is more (respectively, less) egalitarian
than the status quo distribution. Consider, for example, that 푂 is a perfectly
egalitarian proﬁle and 푈 is any proﬁle with some inequality. Then, the union
of 푂 and 푈 will have some inequality and, then, it will be ranked in terms
of equality below 푂. However, it is natural to think that this joint proﬁle
will have less inequality than the proﬁle 푈 .
Intermediateness (INT): For all 푂,푈 ∈ 풩 such that 푂∪ ∩ 푈∪ = ∅,
푂 ≻ 푈 ⇒ 푂 ≻ (푂 ∪ 푈) ≻ 푈
We describe the structure of the criteria that satisfy these two new prop-
erties on top of the three classical properties described above. We need
to introduce the following notation: for all 푂 ∈ 퐿3, 푞푗(푂) = ∣푂휎(푗)∣3∑
푖=1
∣푂푖∣
and
푝푗(푂) =
∣∩푗 푂∣
3∑
푖=1
∣푂푖∣
for all 푗 ∈ 퐼.
Theorem 3.1 If ≿ satisﬁes ANON, ASM, PRI, PM-# and INT, then there
exists 훼 ∈ [0, 1] such that for all 푂,푈 ∈ 퐿3,
푞3(푂) + 훼푞2(푂) > 푞3(푈) + 훼푞2(푈)⇒ 푂 ≻ 푈.
Theorem 3.2 If ≿ satisﬁes ANON, ASM, PRI, PM-⊆ and INT, then there
exists 훽 ∈ [0, 1] such that for all 푂,푈 ∈ 퐿3,
푝3(푂) + 훽푝2(푂) > 푝3(푈) + 훽푝2(푈)⇒ 푂 ≻ 푈.
Observe that when the Cardinality-based Criterion is used to rank in-
dividuals in terms of advantage, Theorem 3.1 establishes a family of crite-
ria that weighs each individual’s percentage share in the total number of
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opportunities. These weights decrease in these percentages, in the sense
that individuals with fewer opportunities are assigned a higher weight in
the social comparison. The value of the parameter 훼 reﬂects the relative
importance that the criterion gives to the individual in the median of the
distribution (higher values indicate more importance). On the other hand,
when the Partial Inclusion Ranking is used to evaluate advantage, Theorem
3.2 establishes a family of criteria that weighs the percentages of oppor-
tunities belonging to each intersection between the opportunity sets of the
individuals. The weights of these intersection sets decrease in the number of
individuals that share each opportunity, in the sense that the opportunities
within the opportunity sets of all individuals have greater weight that the
opportunities belonging to only two individual opportunity sets, and so on.
It is interesting to point out the role of the axioms in our results in
comparison with the results of the independent case. In the independent
evaluation of policies, we can think of the space of policies and determine
the hyperplane that separates good policies from bad policies. IND plays
there a crucial role in determining the existence of such hyperplane, while
the basic ethical axioms (ANON, ASM and PRI) determine the type of
hyperplanes to be found. In the dependent evaluation of policies, we can
no longer proceed in this simple way, as a policy is going to be bad or good
depending on the original opportunity proﬁle. However, INT plays a crucial
role for showing that for every social situation, a hyperplane divides the
good and bad policies. PM is crucial to show that hyperplanes associated
to diﬀerent social situations have the same slope. The basic ethical axioms
(ANON, ASM and PRI) determine again the type of hyperplanes to be
found.
The results established in Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 are not complete char-
acterizations of the criteria that satisfy the axioms. Consider the following
additional Archimedean Diﬀerence property of Kranich [16] and Weymark
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[26] that establishes the following idea: If we have two inﬁnite sequences of
opportunity proﬁles such that each opportunity proﬁle of the ﬁrst is more
egalitarian than its corresponding opportunity proﬁle of the second, then we
can compensate any large diﬀerence between any two opportunity proﬁles
by adding a suﬃciently large number of opportunity proﬁles of the sequences
to each.
Archimedean Diﬀerence (ARCHD): Let {푂푘}푘∈ℕ and {푈푘}푘∈ℕ be two
inﬁnite sequences in 풩 such that 푂푠푖 ∩푂푡푖 = 푈 푠푖 ∩푈 푡푖 = ∅ for all 푠 ∕= 푡 and all
푖 ∈ 퐼. If 푂푘 ≻ 푈푘 for all 푘 ∈ ℕ, then for all 푂ˆ, 푈ˆ ∈ 풩 there exists 퐾 ∈ ℕ
such that 푂1 ∪푂2 ∪ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∪푂퐾 ∪ 푂ˆ ≿ 푈1 ∪ 푈2 ∪ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∪ 푈퐾 ∪ 푈ˆ .
Archimedean Diﬀerence imposes that when ﬁxing a pair of proﬁles 푂ˆ, 푈ˆ ,
regardless of the extent to which 푈ˆ might be more egalitarian than 푂ˆ, this
diﬀerence is eventually overshadowed by the disparities between 푂1, . . . , 푂퐾
and 푈1, . . . , 푈퐾 for suﬃciently large 퐾. In other words, there is no disparity
that cannot be reversed by accumulating a suﬃciently large number of other
disparities.
Imposing ARCHD immediately implies, for each of the families, that all
cases with an equal weighted sum are indiﬀerent.
Corollary 3.1 ≿ satisﬁes ANON, ASM, PRI, PM-#, INT and ARCHD if
and only if there exists 훼 ∈ [0, 1] such that for all 푂,푈 ∈ 퐿3,
푞3(푂) + 훼푞2(푂) ≥ 푞3(푈) + 훼푞2(푈)⇔ 푂 ≿ 푈.
Corollary 3.2 ≿ satisﬁes ANON, ASM, PRI, PM-⊆, INT and ARCHD if
and only if there exists 훽 ∈ [0, 1] such that for all 푂,푈 ∈ 퐿3,
푝3(푂) + 훽푝2(푂) ≥ 푝3(푈) + 훽푝2(푈)⇔ 푂 ≿ 푈.
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4 Concluding remarks
This paper has introduced two new properties, Policy Monotonicity and
Intermediateness, which value the goodness of a policy depending on the
original proﬁle to which they are applied. This is contrary to the classical
tendency that evaluates policies independently of the proﬁle to which they
are applied. We have combined these two new properties with three classical
properties (Anonymity, Assimilation and Priority for the Poor) in order to
construct new criteria to rank opportunity proﬁles in terms of equality.
One of the key concepts for understanding our properties is the redef-
inition of the notion of advantage. The literature has studied two main
possibilities: the Cardinality-based Criterion and the Partial Inclusion Cri-
terion. We have opted for these two possibilities to construct new criteria
to rank opportunity proﬁles. Clearly, the Partial Inclusion Criterion is the
minimal information we may use. Other incomplete criteria could be consid-
ered using other information about the desirability of the opportunities. The
consideration of such a criterion would change the formulation of some of the
properties proposed in this paper, as Policy Monotonicity or Assimilation,
and, therefore, the criteria constructed would be diﬀerent.
Another interesting question for further research would be to study the
dynamics of the opportunity proﬁles across diﬀerent generations; i.e., mo-
bility. It is generally agreed that the possible inequality present in society is
more a cause for concern if the positions of the individuals in the distribu-
tion in each generation are exactly the same as the ones that their parents
have. On the contrary, inequality is not as bad if the positions in the dis-
tribution of the members of the families change across generations (see, for
example, Atkinson [4] and Dardanoni [7]). The concept of policy introduced
in this paper can be adapted to this dynamic context as the description of
the changes from the distribution of opportunities of one generation to the
next one. Then, the classiﬁcation of societies in terms of mobility can be
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performed by ranking policies. However, the analysis of these policies in
the mobility framework may be carried out with diﬀerent axioms that the
ones proposed in this paper for measuring equality. For example, imposing
that all permutation policies are equivalent independently of the set of indi-
viduals that have interchanged their positions, as our Anonymity property
establishes, may be controversial depending on the interpretation of mobil-
ity adopted. For example, this does not seem to be a good property if we
are trying to measure mobility as movement.13
Appendix: Proofs of the results
We will need the following lemmas for the proofs. Let 푄 = {(푥1, 푥2) ∈
[ℚ ∩ (0, 1)]2 ∣ 푥1 ≤ 푥2 ≤ 1−푥12 }.
Lemma 4.1 If ≿ satisﬁes ANON, ASM, PM-# and INT, then there exists
a complete preorder 푅 over 푄 such that 푂 ≿ 푈 if and only if (푞3(푂), 푞2(푂))푅
(푞3(푈), 푞2(푈)).
Proof: In Alcalde-Unzu and Ballester [2], we have shown (Lemma 5.6)
that a ranking satisfying ANON, ASM and IND-# can be expressed by
a complete preorder 푉푟 (with 푉푖 and 푉푝 as its symmetric and asymmetric
parts) over the vectors whose elements are the cardinalities of the individual
opportunity sets (henceforth, the domain 푇 ). Here, we do not have IND-#,
but it can be seen that the unique part of this property needed in that result
is that in which the two original nested proﬁles are indiﬀerent. This part is
included in PM-# and, therefore, we have the same result.
We are now going to prove that for all 푥⃗ ∈ 푇 and all 푘 ∈ ℕ, 푘푥⃗ 푉푖 푥⃗.
Suppose that 푥⃗ 푉푝 푘푥⃗. Then, by INT we have that 푥⃗ 푉푝 (푘 + 1)푥⃗ 푉푝 푘푥⃗. Fur-
ther applications of INT imply that 푥⃗ 푉푝 (2푘+ 1)푥⃗ 푉푝 2푘푥⃗ 푉푝 . . . 푉푝 (푘+ 1)푥⃗.
13To see the diﬀerent approaches to measure mobility, see Van de Gaer et al. [25].
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Furthermore, because (푘+ 1)푥⃗ 푉푝 푘푥⃗, INT implies that (푘+ 1)푥⃗ 푉푝 (2푘+ 1)푥⃗.
Hence, by transitivity, (2푘+1)푥⃗ 푉푝 (2푘+1)푥⃗, which is not possible. The case
of 푘푥⃗ 푉푝 푥⃗ is also impossible and can be proved by similar reasoning. There-
fore, the result is straightforward, given that
∑
푖∈퐼
푞푖(푂) = 1 for all 푂 ∈ 퐿3.
□
The following result can be proved using a very similar argument. We
omit here the proof.
Lemma 4.2 If ≿ satisﬁes ANON, ASM, PM-⊆ and INT, then there exists a
complete preorder 푅 over 푄 such that 푂 ≿ 푈 if and only if (푝3(푂), 푝2(푂))푅
(푝3(푈), 푝2(푈)).
The proof of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 are from now on equivalent, given that
they are based on the equivalence between the criteria on 퐿3 and rankings on
푄. Additionally, properties PRI and INT have exactly the same implications
on 푄, independently on which of the possible interpretations of the elements
of 푄 (the one deduced in Lemma 4.1 or the one in Lemma 4.2) is selected.
Therefore, we opt for including the proof only for Theorem 3.1, but it is easy
to see that Theorem 3.2 can be proved following exactly the same steps.
We now introduce the following deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 4.1 For all 푥⃗, 푦⃗ ∈ 푄, 푥⃗ Lorenz dominates 푦⃗ if 푥1 ≥ 푦1 and
푥1 + 푥2 ≥ 푦1 + 푦2.
Deﬁnition 4.2 For all 푥⃗, 푦⃗ ∈ 푄, 푥⃗ strictly Lorenz dominates 푦⃗ if 푥1 > 푦1
and 푥1 + 푥2 > 푦1 + 푦2.
We formulate the following claims that will help us to construct the
proof.
Claim 4.1 If 푥⃗ Lorenz dominates 푦⃗, then 푥⃗푅푦⃗, with strict preference if the
domination is strict.
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Proof: Let 푥⃗ = (푎1푏1 ,
푎2
푏2
), 푦⃗ = (푎3푏3 ,
푎4
푏4
) and 푡 ∈ ℕ be any common multiple
of {푏1, 푏2, 푏3, 푏4}, where 푎푖, 푏푖 ∈ ℕ, 푖 = 1, . . . , 4. Then, we have 푥⃗ = (푛1푡 , 푛2푡 )
and 푦⃗ = (푛3푡 ,
푛4
푡 ) for some 푛1, 푛2, 푛3, 푛4 ∈ ℕ. By assumption, 푛1 ≥ 푛3 and
푛1 + 푛2 ≥ 푛3 + 푛4. We divide the proof into two cases.
(a) If 푛2 ≥ 푛4, we can construct the following chain using PRI:
(푛1푡 ,
푛2
푡 )푅 (
푛1−1
푡 ,
푛2
푡 )푅 . . . 푅 (
푛3
푡 ,
푛2
푡 )푅 (
푛3
푡 ,
푛2−1
푡 )푅 . . . 푅 (
푛3
푡 ,
푛4
푡 ).
(b) If 푛4 > 푛2, we can construct the following chain using PRI:
(푛1푡 ,
푛2
푡 )푅 (
푛1−1
푡 ,
푛2
푡 )푅 . . . 푅 (
푛3+푛4−푛2
푡 ,
푛2
푡 )푅 (
푛3+푛4−푛2−1
푡 ,
푛2+1
푡 )푅 . . .
푅 (푛3푡 ,
푛4
푡 ),
where use has been made of the assumption that 푛3 + 푛4 − 푛2 ≤ 푛1.
The application of transitivity concludes the proof of the weak case.
We now prove the strict case. As above, let 푥⃗ = (푎1푏1 ,
푎2
푏2
) and 푦⃗ = (푎3푏3 ,
푎4
푏4
).
Then, we can rewrite 푥⃗ and 푦⃗ as 푥⃗ = (푛1푡 ,
푛2
푡 ) and 푦⃗ = (
푛3
푡 ,
푛4
푡 ), with 푛1 > 푛3,
푛1 + 푛2 > 푛3 + 푛4 and 푡 ∈ ℕ a common multiple of {푏1, 푏2, 푏3, 푏4} for which
푛3+1
푡+1 ≤ 푛1푡 and 푛3+1푡+1 + 푛4푡+1 ≤ 푛1푡 + 푛2푡 . Then, we have by the strict part of
PRI that (푛3+1푡+1 ,
푛4
푡+1)푃 (
푛3
푡 ,
푛4
푡 ).
14 Applying the argument in the preceding
case, we have that (푛1푡 ,
푛2
푡 )푅 (
푛3+1
푡+1 ,
푛4
푡+1). Transitivity then concludes the
proof. □
Claim 4.2 For all 푥⃗, 푦⃗ ∈ 푄 and all 휆 ∈ [ℚ ∩ (0, 1)], 푥⃗ 퐼 푦⃗ ⇒ 푥⃗ 퐼 [휆푥⃗ + (1 −
휆)푦⃗] 퐼 푦⃗ and 푥⃗ 푃 푦⃗ ⇒ 푥⃗ 푃 [휆푥⃗+ (1− 휆)푦⃗]푃 푦⃗.
14We derived this from PRI starting with a nested proﬁle in which the disadvantaged
individual has 푛3 opportunities, the advantaged individual has 푡− 푛3 − 푛4 opportunities
and the individual between them has 푛4 opportunities. Then, the result is obtained by
enlarging the opportunity set of the disadvantaged individual by adding an opportunity
that is already possessed by the others.
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Proof: We prove only the ﬁrst equivalence as the proof of other parts
is similar. Let 푥⃗ = (푎1푏1 ,
푎2
푏2
), 푦⃗ = (푎3푏3 ,
푎4
푏4
), 휆 = 휆1휆2 ∈ (0, 1) and 푡 be any
common multiple of {푏1, 푏2, 푏3, 푏4, 휆2}. Consider proﬁles 푂,푈 ∈ 풩 such that
푂∪ ∩푈∪ = ∅, (∣푂3∣, ∣푂2∣, ∣푂1∣) = (푛1, 푛2, 푡− 푛1− 푛2) and (∣푈3∣, ∣푈2∣, ∣푈1∣) =
(푛3, 푛4,
1−휆
휆 푡 − 푛3 − 푛4), where 푛1 = 푎1푏1 푡, 푛2 = 푎2푏2 푡, 푛3 = 푎3푏3 1−휆휆 푡 and 푛4 =
푎4
푏4
1−휆
휆 푡. Then, we can apply INT and we have that 푂 ≻ (푂∪푈) ≻ 푈 . Note
that ∣푂1∣+∣푂2∣+∣푂3∣+∣푈1∣+∣푈2∣+∣푈3∣ = 푡휆 . Thus, in terms of 푄, (푂∪푈) can
be expressed as [(푛1 +푛3)
휆
푡 , (푛2 +푛4)
휆
푡 ] = [휆
푎1
푏1
+ (1−휆)푎3푏3 , 휆푎2푏2 + (1−휆)푎4푏4 ],
and we arrive at the desired result. □
Claim 4.3 For all 푥⃗, 푦⃗, (푘푥⃗− (푘− 1)푦⃗) ∈ 푄 with 푘 ∈ ℚ such that 푘 > 1, we
have that
푥⃗ 퐼 푦⃗ ⇔ [푘푥⃗− (푘 − 1)푦⃗] 퐼 푥⃗,
푥⃗ 푃 푦⃗ ⇔ [푘푥⃗− (푘 − 1)푦⃗]푃 푥⃗,
and
푥⃗ 푃 푦⃗ ⇔ 푦⃗ 푃 [푘푦⃗ − (푘 − 1)푥⃗].
Proof: We only prove the ﬁrst equivalence given that the proof of the others
is similar. Suppose that 푥⃗ 퐼 푦⃗, but [푘푥⃗−(푘−1)푦⃗]푃 푥⃗. Then, [푘푥⃗−(푘−1)푦⃗]푃 푦⃗.
By applying Claim 4.2 to this preference with 휆 = 1푘 , we have that 푥⃗ 푃 푦⃗,
which is not possible. If, on the other hand, 푥⃗ 퐼 푦⃗, but 푥⃗ 푃 [푘푥⃗ − (푘 − 1)푦⃗],
we also have that 푦⃗ 푃 [푘푥⃗ − (푘 − 1)푦⃗]. Then, we can apply Claim 4.2 with
휆 = 푘−1푘 and we have that 푦⃗ 푃 푥⃗, which is not possible. □
Claim 4.4 For all 푥⃗, 푦⃗ ∈ 푄 and all 휆1, 휆2 ∈ ℚ such that 푧1 = 휆1푥⃗ + (1 −
휆1)푦⃗, 푧2 = 휆2푥⃗+ (1− 휆2)푦⃗ ∈ 푄,
(a) 푥⃗ 퐼 푦⃗ ⇒ 푥⃗ 퐼 푧⃗1 퐼 푧⃗2 퐼 푦⃗
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and
(b) If 푥⃗ 푃 푦⃗, then 푧⃗1 푃 푧⃗2 ⇔ 휆1 > 휆2.
Proof: We prove the second part, and omit the proof of the ﬁrst part,
given that it is proved in a similar way. Suppose that 푧⃗1 푃 푧⃗2 but 휆1 ≤ 휆2.
Reﬂexivity excludes the possibility that 휆1 = 휆2. Suppose that 휆1 < 휆2. If
휆2 > 0 and 휆1 < 0, because 푥⃗ 푃 푦⃗, we have 푧⃗2 푃 푦⃗ by Claim 4.2 and 푦⃗ 푃 푧⃗1
by Claim 4.3. By transitivity, we conclude 푧⃗2 푃 푧⃗1, which is not possible. If
휆푖 > 0 for 푖 = {1, 2}, we divide the proof into the following cases:
(a) If 휆푖 ∈ (0, 1) for 푖 = {1, 2}, by Claim 4.2 with 휆 = 휆2 we have that
푥⃗ 푃 푧⃗2 푃 푦⃗. Then, given that 휆1 < 휆2, it follows from 푧⃗2 푃 푦⃗ and Claim 4.2
that 푧⃗2 푃 푧⃗1 푃 푦⃗, which contradicts the assumption.
(b) If there exists 푘 ∈ ℕ such that (휆푖 − 푘) ∈ (0, 1) for all 푖 ∈ {1, 2}, we
can deduce from Claim 4.3 that 푥⃗ 푃 푦⃗ ⇔ [(푘 + 1)푥⃗ − 푘푦⃗]푃 [푘푥⃗ − (푘 − 1)푦⃗].
Given that 푥⃗ 푃 푦⃗, we have that [(푘 + 1)푥⃗ − 푘푦⃗]푃 [푘푥⃗ − (푘 − 1)푦⃗]. Now, we
can apply Claim 4.2 and we have that [(푘+ 1)푥⃗− 푘푦⃗]푃 푧⃗1 푃 [푘푥⃗− (푘− 1)푦⃗].
Then, given that 휆1 < 휆2, it follows from [(푘+ 1)푥⃗− 푘푦⃗]푃 푧⃗1 and Claim 4.2
that [(푘 + 1)푥⃗− 푘푦⃗]푃 푧⃗2 푃 푧⃗1, which contradicts the assumption.
(c) If 휆1 ∈ (0, 1) and 휆2 > 1, we have by Claim 4.3 and INT that 푧⃗2 푃 푥⃗
and 푥⃗ 푃 푧⃗1 푃 푦⃗, and applying transitivity we arrive at a contradiction.
(d) If (휆1 − 푘) ∈ (0, 1) and (휆2 − 푘′) ∈ (0, 1) with 푘 < 푘′ , we can apply
reasoning similar to that used in the preceding case.
The case in which 휆푖 < 0 is similar and, thus, it is omitted. □
Claim 4.5 For all 훼⃗ ∈ ℤ2 and all 푥⃗, 푦⃗, (푥⃗+ 훼⃗), (푦⃗ + 훼⃗) ∈ 푄, we have that
(푥⃗+ 훼⃗)푅 푥⃗⇔ (푦⃗ + 훼⃗)푅 푦⃗.
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Proof: First, we know from Claim 4.1 that for all 훼⃗ ∈ ℤ2 such that 훼1 > 0
and 훼1 + 훼2 > 0 that (푥⃗ + 훼⃗)푃 푥⃗ for all 푥⃗ ∈ 푄. We can also deduce from
Claim 4.1 that for all 훼⃗ ∈ ℤ2 such that 훼1 < 0 and 훼1 + 훼2 < 0, we have
that 푥⃗ 푃 (푥⃗+ 훼⃗) for all 푥⃗ ∈ 푄. Thus, without loss of generality, we only need
to consider the cases in which 훼1 ≥ 0, 훼2 < 0 and 훼1 ≤ ∣훼2∣.15 We divide
the proof into the following cases:
(a) If 푥⃗ Lorenz dominates 푦⃗, we have by Claim 4.1 that 푥⃗ 푅 푦⃗. Suppose
that (푥⃗ + 훼⃗)푅 푥⃗. Then we can apply PM-# and we have that (푦⃗ + 훼⃗)푅 푦⃗.
Now, suppose that 푥⃗ 푅 (푥⃗+ 훼⃗). We also know that (푥⃗+ 훼⃗) Lorenz dominates
(푦⃗ + 훼⃗). Then we can apply PM-# and we have that 푦⃗ 푅 (푦⃗ + 훼⃗).
(b) If 푦⃗ Lorenz dominates 푥⃗, the reasoning is similar to that used in part
(a).
(c) If there is no Lorenz domination between 푥⃗ and 푦⃗, suppose, without
loss of generality, that 푦1 > 푥1, 푦1 + 푦2 < 푥1 + 푥2 and (푥⃗ + 훼⃗)푅 푥⃗. Then,
we have that 푦1 = 푥1 + 휆1훼1 and 푦2 = 푥2 + 휆2훼2. If 휆1 = 휆2 = 휆 > 0, we
know that 푦⃗ = 푥⃗ + 휆훼⃗ and (푦⃗ + 훼⃗) = 푥⃗ + (휆 + 1)훼⃗. Then, with 푘 = 휆 + 1,
we have that [푘(푦⃗ + 훼⃗) − (푘 − 1)푥⃗] = 푦⃗. Given that (푥⃗ + 훼⃗)푅 푥⃗, we can
apply Claim 4.3 and we have that (푦⃗ + 훼⃗)푅 푦⃗. If 휆 < 0, we can prove this
claim by reduction to the absurd. Suppose that 푦⃗ 푃 (푦⃗ + 훼⃗). Then, we can
deduce by the same reasoning as above that 푥⃗ 푃 (푥⃗+ 훼⃗), which leads us to
a contradiction.
If 휆1 < 휆2, consider the vectors 푧⃗ = (푦1, 푥2 + 휆1훼2), 푤⃗ = (푦1 + 훼1, 푥2 +
(휆1 + 1)훼2) ∈ 푄, that obviously exist. We have that 푧⃗ and 푤⃗ satisﬁes the
conditions of the above case. Therefore, 푤⃗ 푅 푧⃗. We also have by Claim 4.1
that 푧⃗ 푅 푦⃗. Then, we can apply PM-# and we have that (푦⃗ + 훼⃗)푅 푦⃗. The
case in which 휆1 > 휆2 can be proved by similar reasoning. □
15The remaining cases can be easily deduced from this analysis.
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In view of the preceding results, we can focus exclusively on the changes
in the percentages of the total number of opportunities available to the
individuals. We deﬁne a correspondence 푔 : (ℝ+ ∪ {∞}) → {퐺,퐵} in the
following way:
퐺 ∈ 푔(푥)⇔ (푦⃗ + 훼⃗)푅 푦⃗ for all 푦⃗, (푦⃗ + 훼⃗) ∈ 푄 for which 훼1훼2 = 푥.
퐵 ∈ 푔(푥)⇔ 푦⃗ 푅 (푦⃗ + 훼⃗) for all 푦⃗, (푦⃗ + 훼⃗) ∈ 푄 for which 훼1훼2 = 푥.
Claim 4.6 If 푥, 푦 ∈ (ℝ+ ∪ {∞}) such that 푥 > 푦, then
퐺 ∈ 푔(푦)⇒ 퐺 = 푔(푥)
퐵 ∈ 푔(푥)⇒ 퐵 = 푔(푦)
Proof: We prove only the ﬁrst part of the claim, the proof of the second
part is similar. Suppose that 퐺 ∈ 푔(푦), with 훼1훼2 = 푦. We also know that
훽1
훽2
= 푥. Then, we can rewrite 푥 and 푦 as 훼1훽2훼2훽2 = 푦 and
훽1훼2
훼2훽2
= 푥. As
푔 ∈ 퐺(푦), we know that (푦1 + 훼1훽2, 푦2 + 훼2훽2)푅 푧⃗ for all 푧⃗, (푧1 + 훼1훽2, 푧2 +
훼2훽2) ∈ 푄. Given that 훽1훼2 > 훼1훽2, we can apply Claim 4.1 and we have
that (푧1 + 훽1훼2, 푧2 +훼2훽2)푃 (푧1 +훼1훽2, 푧2 +훼2훽2) and by transitivity, that
(푧1 + 훽1훼2, 푧2 + 훼2훽2)푃 푧⃗. Therefore, 퐺 = 푔(푥). □
We now deﬁne
푥∗ = inf[푥 ∈ (ℝ+ ∪ {∞}) such that 퐺 ∈ 푔(푥)]
and
푥∗ = sup[푥 ∈ (ℝ+ ∪ {∞}) such that 퐵 ∈ 푔(푥)].
We are going to prove that 푥∗ = 푥∗. If 푥∗ > 푥∗, there exists 푦 ∈ ℝ such
that 푥∗ > 푦 > 푥∗. That is, 퐺 ∕∈ 푔(푦) and 퐵 ∕∈ 푔(푦), which is not possible.
If 푥∗ < 푥∗, then there exists 푧 ∈ ℝ such that 푥∗ < 푧 < 푥∗. Then, we have
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by Claim 4.6 that 푔(푧) = 퐺 and 푔(푧) = 퐵, which is not possible. Therefore,
푥∗ = 푥∗ = 훽.
It is now straightforward to see that the rankings are such that
푥1 + 훼푥2 > 푦1 + 훼푦2 ⇒ 푥⃗ 푃 푦⃗
Furthermore, PRI ensures that 훼 ∈ [0, 1], and Theorem 3.1 is proved.
Independence of the axioms
Consider the following rankings:
푂 ≿푎 푈 ⇔ ∣푂3∣
퐶푆(푂)
≥ ∣푈3∣
퐶푆(푈)
푂 ≿푏 푈 ⇔ 푞3(푂)− 2 ⋅ 푞1(푂) ≥ 푞3(푈)− 2 ⋅ 푞1(푈)
푂 ∼푐 푈 for all 푂,푈 ∈ 퐿3
푂 ≿푑 푈 ⇔ 푝3(푂) ≥ 푝3(푈)
푂 ≿푒 푈 ⇔ ∣푂휎(3)∣ ≥ ∣푈휎(3)∣
푂 ≿푓 푈 ⇔ 푞3(푂) > 푞3(푈) or [푞3(푂) = 푞3(푈) and 푞2(푂) > 푞2(푈)]
푂 ≿푔 푈 ⇔ ∣푂
∩∣+ ∣푂2 ∩푂3∣
퐶푆(푂)
≥ ∣푈
∩∣+ ∣푈2 ∩ 푈3∣
퐶푆(푈)
푂 ≿ℎ 푈 ⇔ 푝3(푂)− 2 ⋅ 푝1(푂) ≥ 푝3(푈)− 2 ⋅ 푝1(푈)
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푂 ≿푖 푈 ⇔ 푞3(푂) ≥ 푞3(푈)
푂 ≿푗 푈 ⇔ ∣푂∩∣ ≥ ∣푈∩∣
푂 ≿푘 푈 ⇔ 푝3(푂) > 푝3(푈) or [푝3(푂) = 푝3(푈) and 푝2(푂) > 푝2(푈)]
It is easy to see that ≿푎 satisfy all axioms of Corollary 3.1 except ANON.
Similarly, ≿푏 satisﬁes all axioms except ASM, ≿푐 satisﬁes all properties
except PRI and ≿푑 satisﬁes all axioms except PM-#. Finally, ≿푒 satisﬁes
all axioms except INT and ≿푓 satisfy all properties except ARCHD.
Similarly, ≿푔 satisfy all axioms of Corollary 3.2 except ANON. Similarly,
≿ℎ satisﬁes all axioms except ASM, ≿푐 satisﬁes all properties except PRI
and ≿푖 satisﬁes all axioms except PM-⊆. Finally, ≿푗 satisﬁes all axioms
except INT and ≿푓 satisfy all properties except ARCHD.
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